The main question concerns the identity of the individual raised (either a person or a body) with the individual who died. Why is the resurrected individual the very same individual who died, rather than a mere replica or facsimile of the original?
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It seems to me that the doctrine of the soul and the intermediate state between physical death and resurrection goes a long way towards solving the problem because in that case, the person never actually ceases to exist when he dies physically.
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But while this solution suffices to guarantee personal identity, it does not solve the problem of the identity between the resurrection body and the pre-mortem body.
Quotes from Bill & Jan Craig on
Reasonable Faith, Newsletter May 2026
http://pages.reasonablefaith.org/pages/1787618/57390
William Lane Craig then speaks of the Jewish view about "bones", but forgets, what I find in St. Thomas:
others held that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in his exposition of Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc.
Supplement, Question 79. The conditions of those who rise again, and first of their identity
Article 1. Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical body?
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/5079.htm#article1
The Old Testament belief is, thus, not just tied to the bones, but also to the flesh.
The Fourth Council of the Lateran decreed that (Denzinger 801 / 429*) we need to believe:
venturus in fine saeculi, iudicaturus vivos et mortuos, et redditurus singulis secundum opera sua, tam reprobis quam electis: qui omnes cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus, quae nunc gestant, ut recipiant secundum opera sua, sive bona fuerint sive mala, illi cum diabolo poenam perpetuam, et isti cum Christo gloriam sempiternam.
[I translate] and He will be returning at the end of the age, to judge the quick and the dead, and be giving back to each according to his works, both reprobate and elect: who all will rise with the own bodies, which now they carry, to receive according to their works, whether good or bad, the ones with the devil the unending punishment and the others with Christ the everlasting glory
So, does St. Thomas deal with the problem in the same article? Yes:
Objection 3. Further, after death, as stated above (Supplement:78:3), the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the self-same body if it be restored from these parts.
Reply to Objection 3. That which is understood as though it were in matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to generation and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions, by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.
To cut the Scholastic jargon, he's saying, even if the corpse is not identical to the body that was alive, because it's a corpse, it's more identical than any other thing, for instance than the linen the corpse is lying on or the coffin it is lying in.
Here is another article, dealing with it, and I cite the corpus:
I answer that, In this question it makes a difference whether we ask what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done for the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed that in man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh, or the various parts of bone; secondly, as of various parts of various species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and flesh. Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter will return to another part of the same species, this causes no change except in the position of the parts: and change of position of parts does not change the species in homogeneous wholes: and so if the matter of one part return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of the whole. Thus is it in the example given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44), because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same, not as to its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which it is a particular substance, and in this way a statue is homogeneous, although it is not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another part of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: yet so that the whole matter, or something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred to another. but not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of the whole is removed, if we speak of essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers (De Civ. Dei xxii). It is thus clear how the transference of matter from one part of another destroys the identity, and how it does not.
But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as nails and hair.
But the crux of the matter is in the previous question:
Question 78. The term "wherefrom" of the resurrection
Article 2. Whether all will rise again from ashes?**
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/5078.htm#article2
And especially the following article, which I quote:
I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this reason have a natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.
Article 3. Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/5078.htm#article3
So, the solution is, God's Providence keeps record and restores particles of matter. Presumably William Lane Craig believes that carbon atoms in Cain are still around as carbon atoms, nearer or further from his corpse or where it was. So, whether Abel was already raised in that Earthquake from Calvary and his tomb is empty, Cain (or if you think he repented, some other evil man from back then) still has the particles of his body on earth.
Have you ever solved a Rubik's Cube? Compare the six sides to six bodies, like half of the sons of Jacob. Whether they already rose on Good Friday or will rise, before they rose, or will have risen, presumably their constituent molecules were jumbled. Inside each and with the outside. Like the colours are jumbled on a Rubik's Cube. But God doesn't need to solve the problem by guess work, He has kept perfect track of each square of the nine squares of a colour or each molecule and each atom of each molecule of each human body.
That's part of what we mean by God being Omniscient.
Now, C. S. Lewis, once, in a book that has bad sides, said "there wouldn't be enough matter to go around" ... this is because CSL while writing this believed in Deep Time. If William Lane Craig believes in an Adam who was created 750 000 years ago, he may have the same problem.
I do not believe that, but that God created the world in 5200 or 5220 BC. Or not far off.*** So, there would be enough matter to go around. Did St. Thomas state more? Yes:
Question 77. The time and manner of the resurrection
Article 4. Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/5077.htm#article4
And the problem (or one of them) is, God is not teleporting the individual parts with no time between.
Objection 4. Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De Sensu et Sensato vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement in the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.
Reply to Objection 4. The gathering of the ashes which cannot be without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on account of the facility of operation which is competent to the angels.
So, the angels will actually be gathering bits and pieces, down to the size of individual atoms, presumably, of each person to resurrect the body of. But when these have been gathered, God does the actual resurrecting.
Hans Georg Lundahl
Nanterre UL
St. Fidelis of Sigmaringen
24.IV.2026
Sevisii, in Rhaetia, sancti Fidelis a Sigmaringa, Sacerdotis ex Ordine Minorum Capuccinorum et Martyris; qui, illuc ad praedicandam catholicam fidem missus, ibidem, ab haereticis interemptus, martyrium consummavit; et a Benedicto Decimo quarto, Pontifice Maximo, inter sanctos Martyres relatus est.
* My source is this site: http://catho.org/9.php?d=bxw and I suppose that fat numbers are one and italics numbers another edition of Denzinger. ** Q78 A1 is beside our question, but more germaine to the debate on the Rapture. *** Jesus is born 5199 after Creation. But since He's born 752 after Rome was founded, presumably that puts Creation in 5200 BC. Again, a pre-Flood world of 2242 years is arguably a misreading of a pre-Flood world of 2262 years, Genesis 5:25 (LXX) And Mathusala lived an hundred and sixty and seven years, and begot Lamech. Should read: an hundred and eighty and seven years etc. The sixty being a contamination from info on Henoch. The Roman Martyrology has the Exodus so that Christ was born 1510 after the Exodus, if there is a readjustment to Exodus in 1446, but things before that as given, this would place Creation to 5155 BC.