Is God THE Necessary Being - part 1

Is God THE Necessary Being?
Part I · Part II · Part III

Between Thomists and Carrier, no one is pretending that God is "a" necessary being, among several.

The claim of St Thomas Aquinas is fairly clear : God is THE necessary being, all being outside God being contingent.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be.

Dr. Who and any rabbit howsoever magical would fit in this category, Mr. Carrier (referring to our debate).

But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.

Note, it would seem that he is only saying it is impossible for each to always exist, and obviously we are here dealing with "given infinite time" - since with time having a beginning, God starting it is easy to prove.

Actually, for each, given less than actually infinite time (if any needed infinite time back to have a beginning or infinite time forward to have an end, it would NOT have a beginning or an end and therefore be a necessary being).

Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence.

At first glance, he would seem to be overreaching. When a body falls apart by corruption and dissolution in water, its constituent parts become parts of other bodies, right, Demokritos?

Well, the solution that there are always particles and that no visible body begins or ceases except by taking particles from or giving particles to other bodies ... is not a refutation, but is a pretense that "atoms" as Demokritos would have it (we use the name somewhat differently) are the necessary being. Along with space coordinates for the non-being surrounding each on each side, of course.

What St Thomas is envisaging is of course nothing to do with atoms so far, since he is speaking from empirical evidence, and atoms would be one theoretical solution. He is so far not concerned with what theoretical solution, he is concerned with establishing the concept of necessary being.

Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.

Famously, Mr. Carrier has actually tried to refute by the 8 propositions.

Here is his proposition number 2:

Proposition 2: The most nothingly state of nothing that can ever obtain, is a state of affairs of zero size lacking all properties and contents, except that which is logically necessary.

My emphasis. Now, the problem is, "excapt that which is logically necessary" sounds suspiciously like the term St Thomas is establishing : the necessary being.

Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd.

Will Mr. Carrier say "we only have Thomas Aquinas' word for it being absurd"?

I think he has dealt so with fairly self evident things in relation to Feser ...

No, seriously, I think that Mr. Carrier will admit that things actually exist.

Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary.

Will Demokritan atoms do?

But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not.

What if Demokritan atoms have their necessity caused by some other being?

If they were the really necessary being, how is spacetime derived from them?

If they are a necessary being, along with spacetime, how is the relation arranged?

If they are arranged in spacetime, because spacetime is more necessary than they, how can spacetime actually cause particles?

Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.

Recapitulation of this point in prima and secunda via:

Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Everyone except Mr. Carrier and his fellow materialists, I presume ... these preferring forces acting on particles in spacetime ...

Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Except Mr. Carrier, I presume, who think it is sth like matter or energy, I presume. With his fellow materialists, of course.

Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

And since Mr. Carrier's fellow materialists, the ancient Epicureans, were out of fashion several centuries before St Thomas, he is using the phrase "all men" ... meaning all men except the materialists he was not thinking of, since they did not socially exist.

Now, could Carrier be right that the necessary being is particles acted on by forces, these residing in the particles and all residing in spacetime?

I have already given a hint on why this is actually not very likely: if the Demokritan atoms were the really necessary being, how is spacetime derived from them?

If they are a necessary being, along with spacetime, how is the relation arranged?

If they are arranged in spacetime, because spacetime is more necessary than they, how can spacetime actually cause particles?

Hans Georg Lundahl
Paris
XVIth Lord's Day after Pentecost
9.IX.2018