Is God THE Necessary Being? Part III

Is God THE Necessary Being?
Part I · Part II · Part III

We can compare ...

We can compare the whole endeavour to the easier exercise of proving what is indeed in some sense true, that there is a unique thing, immutable, timeless, simple, immune to evil and necessarily existing, between zero and two.

TLS : Enlightened thinking?
SIMON BLACKBURN | September 5, 2018
https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/enlightened-thinking-atheism-god/

This is probably what Feser meant here:

Blackburn’s playful comparison of a divine first cause to a number ignores the rather crucial difference that numbers are (notoriously) causally inert. This is a little like saying that a living man is like a dead man, except for being living.

This misses a point about FIRST mover, FIRST cause, FIRST necessary being.

It seems, Blackburn has even (at least verbally) admitted their existence.* He has just refused to identify them with the Christian God:

Light a candle and kneel in silent contemplation by all means – it is after all good, in the sense that there is nothing deficient about it (you cannot imagine a better number one). But then adding that this number is something you might one day see face to face, or something that sends messengers to earth occasionally, or has a chosen people, or something that prefers humanity to the ebola virus, or that underwrites the kinds of edicts that Feser’s Church typically makes, commanding that we ban assisted suicide and birth control, and avoid gay sex, strongly suggests exactly the confusions besetting Hobbes’s rustic.

Now, perhaps it is not only in causation, but also in explanation or proof or definition that Feser misses a point about "first".

Certainly there is no coherent way to draw it, as many atheists attempt to do, at the fundamental laws of nature. Higher-level laws are explained by lower-level laws in something like the way the book on the top of a stack is held up by the ones below it. Take away the floor, and there is nothing that gives the bottom book any power to hold up the top book. Similarly, make the fundamental laws into unintelligible brute facts, and they have no intelligibility to pass upward to higher-level laws – which in turn will have no intelligibility to pass along to the phenomena they are supposed to be explaining. The world’s being just a little bit unintelligible is like its being just a little bit pregnant. Or it is like having a cancer that metastasizes unto the remotest extremity.

False. All explanation involves some level of precisely brute fact, intelligible as to what, but not as to why, which confers an added intelligibility on what is explained, so that it is intelligible both as to what and also as to at least one why.

If you pretend that even the first fundamental law needs to in its turn be explained by an even more fundamental one - you have given up the Thomistic sense of "first".

Indeed, many Neo-Thomists have come to do so. I claim, as a Geocentric, God is moving the aether, which is moving the Sun, the Moon and the Planets and Stars Westward at an angular speed of 360 ° every stellar day, every 23^h 56^m 4.098 903 691^s and that an Angel is moving Eastward any heavenly body that takes longer than that time, notably the Sun which takes a full 24^h for 360° AND that this is what the Prima Via, First Mover, is most basically about. Answers a Neo-Thomist "no, God moves through secondary causes".

Well, the aether moving westward at 360° every 23^h 56^m 4.098 903 691^s IS a secondary cause and one directly moved by the First cause. But the Neo-Thomist would require that secondary cause to also be moved by a secondary cause, not directly by God, and then, from physics giving famously the rules for secondary causes, he would scrap Geocentrism, as there is probably no secondary cause able to move the aether of all the universe around earth 360° westward every 23^h 56^m 4.098 903 691^s. When Sungenis suggests that inertia and conservation of momentum would apply as such a secondary cause, he is in fact scrapping the Thomistic sense of First mover (in contemporary causation) and reducing God to a Newtonian style earliest mover (in temporal succession of causes).

The problem with this is, if EVERY secondary cause according to the dictum "God moves through secondary causes" needed to be caused by another precisely secondary cause, then that would constitute a glaring denial of St Thomas' need for secondary causes to depend on a first cause.

Now, Carrier has a better grasp on this, at least in the domain of explanation:

Carrier

But it’s possible for things to exist that no language can describe, so merely being meaningless is not a sufficient conclusion.

[on why contradictum in adiecto cannot exist]

Simon

Has the idea [entities can exist that are linguistically indescribable] been logically demonstrated?

Carrier

Describe the color green.

(Not what things are green. Or what causes us to experience the color green. But what being green consists of. Describe the thing itself, without referencing any green thing or any causes of it.)

In other words, in the domain of explanation, Carrier knows that there is a FIRST, sth which can explain or enter into explanations, but which itself cannot be explained or defined.

While green can in given instances be causally explained, it cannot be explained further in the direction of definition, at least according to Carrier.

A painter might counter "it's a colour, it's a cold colour and it's a passive colour".

Warm : Red and Yellow, Cold : Green and Blue.
Active : Red and Blue, Passive : Yellow and Green.

And here you must admit, there is a level on which we see that this is fitting as a description of these colours, but we cannot explain this to a colour blind person. And we cannot either even by this description make someone imagine correctly "green", it only works as identifying its relation to other colours.

So, yes, in description there is a first. There is a fact which is brute fact with which other things are described.

Therefore, there is also (contra Feser) a fact which is brute fact, with which other things are explained causally.

Now, the thing is, with only the first three ways and with no Geocentrism allowed "any more" in the first way, we cannot prove that the "ultimate first" is personal. First mover? Could be energy. First necessary existent? Could be matter. First cause? Could be the couple matter/energy.

Other version, since according to Einstein matter is a form of energy, energy in the physical sense could be all that were needed. Especially if we skip all the questiones after Q 2 A 3.

Now, look at Fourth and Fifth ways.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Persons are nobler than stones and more existent than stones, therefore the noblest thing in this gradation also needs to be personal.

The extra criterium of that ultra thing which confers the quality on things having it in lesser degree could even be brushed off as Platonic pseudo-science.

Except for ... presuppositional, see previous part.

And governance, fifth way. With no centre of the Universe and no extraordinary complexity of movements around it (like in denying Geocentrism), and with all local centres being so by simple gravity and with Eco-Systems actually being by-products of Evolution, no Fifth way either. Not for a personal God.

Therefore, the need for Geocentrism and Creationism. These are however available.

Now, the fact is, Heliocentrism is built on a kind of radical scepticism which St Thomas Aquinas was NOT counting.

I'll have to deal with it, so I reformulate.

You can accept Empirical evidence as it is, and you can from there conclude God exists.

Or, you can accept Atheism as a postulate for explanations, and you can from there build an anti-Empiric science, like Heliocentrism.

So, if we accept Empirical evidence, Sun and Moon and Venus and Jupiter are each day turning around Earth and if we abstract from that, Venus and Jupiter are doing such marvellous dances that they need a choreographer, apart from the question how a biggy like Sol would dance around our small Earth without one ... and that argues the choreographer is also first mover - His moving things is the prime law of any movement - and the necessary being - how could He be First mover all over the cosmos without also being that?

Either, the necessary being is God, or, empiry is wildly misleading. Which, in a way parallel to presuppositional apologetics, argues that you can know nothing much if there is no God.

Hans Georg Lundahl
ut in priori et secunda parte

* Probably the wording "between zero and two" means he is accepting the "number line" ideology of arithmetic. That would mean, "one" is to him not the first principle of number. This would then constitute a disagreement with St Thomas even on the Five Ways.

Is God THE Necessary Being? Part II

Is God THE Necessary Being?
Part I · Part II · Part III

If I have been lazy, my excuse is Carrier has been even lazier in relation to me. I was just reminded of my negligence a few moments ago (or ok, a quarter of on hour or half hour or whatever).

Since Feser just replied to another Humean, Blackford, on the Five Proofs, I'll link to Feser's reply:

Edward Feser : Reply to Blackburn on Five Proofs
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/09/reply-to-blackburn-on-five-proofs.html

I actually intended to take my Presuppositional observation in part III and something else (upcoming in part III now) in part II.

However, one quote from Feser will quickly bring me to C. S. Lewis' Miracles, and its version of Presuppositional Apologetics.

The broadly Humean epistemology he deploys against the Scholastic theism I defend in Five Proofs of the Existence of God requires a careful balancing act. On the one hand, Blackburn must limit the powers of human reason sufficiently to prevent them from being able to penetrate, in any substantive way, into the ultimate “springs and principles” of nature. For that is the only way to block ascent to a divine first cause – the existence and nature of which, the Scholastic says, follows precisely from an analysis of what it would be to be an ultimate explanation.

Now, this reminds me of precisely a weakness in 8 Propositions. By the way, they seem to be now extended to 9 and 10, unless I simply missed the last ones previously.

These are propositions about a non-universe, a nothing in the sense of an absence of anything except what is necessary.

Now, in a comment under that article Carrier stated:

Logical contradictions reference nothing, and thus have no actual meaning in any language (each part of a contradiction has meaning; but their conjunction is meaningless). But it’s possible for things to exist that no language can describe, so merely being meaningless is not a sufficient conclusion. It’s enough for most things, since usually all we need know is what a sentence references, and when the answer is “nothing,” we can move on. But there is a deeper question as to why contradictory states of affairs can’t materialize. It’s not enough to say language couldn’t describe it. As arguing from that would be a non sequitur.

This is a question in the ontology of logic: what exactly is it, that makes logical laws describe all actual things too, not just languages. Why, in other words, does the universe obey the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). It’s easy to show why language always must. But that by itself doesn’t explain why not just language, but even universes, must obey.

I do answer this in SAG but I get more specific and detailed in my response to Reppert (also linked in the article above), under the heading Ontology of Logic. The short of it is this: the only state of being that would be correctly described as not obeying the LNC, is a state of being that contained no distinctions; but distinctions are always possible; even the attempt to assert they are impossible asserts they exist and thus are possible. For there to be something that existed that prevented distinctions from existing, entails distinctions exist: a distinction between the presence and the absence of that something; and if there is nothing preventing distinctions from existing, distinctions always exist: e.g. a distinction exists between distinctions being possible and distinctions being impossible.

Is this a logical or a physical fact?

The LNC is thus just a restatement of a physical fact: distinctions exist. Which is always true, because the moment any state of being obtains, it comes with distinctions.

OK, with things existing, there are distinctions. So, it is a physical fact.

I'll go down this alley, Carrier.

If it is a physical fact, it does not apply to your propositions about "nothing". Also, if it is about "distinctions", it cannot apply to a nothing which lacks distinctions.

So, the only way in which you can reason at all about the logical consequences of nothing and count on your "language logic" to apply to "the logic of things" is, if you have an access to a logic which rules the logic of all and any things under any circumstances whatsoever - but in order for this to be so, this logic needs to be a mind, ruling physical things and distinctions like your mind rules your body. Or sth like that.

If your mind only had access to the logic that physically shaped you, you would be able to reason about your surroundings, not about this kind of ultimate problem.

This is even more clear, if the words about LNC and distinctions are supposed to be a logical fact, while this would allow it to apply to "nothing" (except what is logically necessary) it is only possible if there is a logic above physics.

That is why Sherlock Holmes refuses to philosophise. He is basically an atheist, but a weak atheist : he knows that if [evolutionary] atheism is true, then its truth is a matter beyond what his mind was evolved to know.

If your position is the truth, it is a truth which can never be known. The fact that you treat it as sth which can be known shows you are wrong.

So, for logic to apply without exceptions, even to "nothing", it is necessary that God is. This makes God a known, not just candidate, but actual claimant to the title "nothing except what is logically necessary". So much for your "as far as we know".

I'll be saying a thing or two on Feser next time, in part III.

Hans Georg Lundahl
Nanterre UL
St. Matthew Apostle
21.IX.2018

Is God THE Necessary Being - part 1

Is God THE Necessary Being?
Part I · Part II · Part III

Between Thomists and Carrier, no one is pretending that God is "a" necessary being, among several.

The claim of St Thomas Aquinas is fairly clear : God is THE necessary being, all being outside God being contingent.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be.

Dr. Who and any rabbit howsoever magical would fit in this category, Mr. Carrier (referring to our debate).

But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.

Note, it would seem that he is only saying it is impossible for each to always exist, and obviously we are here dealing with "given infinite time" - since with time having a beginning, God starting it is easy to prove.

Actually, for each, given less than actually infinite time (if any needed infinite time back to have a beginning or infinite time forward to have an end, it would NOT have a beginning or an end and therefore be a necessary being).

Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence.

At first glance, he would seem to be overreaching. When a body falls apart by corruption and dissolution in water, its constituent parts become parts of other bodies, right, Demokritos?

Well, the solution that there are always particles and that no visible body begins or ceases except by taking particles from or giving particles to other bodies ... is not a refutation, but is a pretense that "atoms" as Demokritos would have it (we use the name somewhat differently) are the necessary being. Along with space coordinates for the non-being surrounding each on each side, of course.

What St Thomas is envisaging is of course nothing to do with atoms so far, since he is speaking from empirical evidence, and atoms would be one theoretical solution. He is so far not concerned with what theoretical solution, he is concerned with establishing the concept of necessary being.

Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.

Famously, Mr. Carrier has actually tried to refute by the 8 propositions.

Here is his proposition number 2:

Proposition 2: The most nothingly state of nothing that can ever obtain, is a state of affairs of zero size lacking all properties and contents, except that which is logically necessary.

My emphasis. Now, the problem is, "excapt that which is logically necessary" sounds suspiciously like the term St Thomas is establishing : the necessary being.

Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd.

Will Mr. Carrier say "we only have Thomas Aquinas' word for it being absurd"?

I think he has dealt so with fairly self evident things in relation to Feser ...

No, seriously, I think that Mr. Carrier will admit that things actually exist.

Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary.

Will Demokritan atoms do?

But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not.

What if Demokritan atoms have their necessity caused by some other being?

If they were the really necessary being, how is spacetime derived from them?

If they are a necessary being, along with spacetime, how is the relation arranged?

If they are arranged in spacetime, because spacetime is more necessary than they, how can spacetime actually cause particles?

Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.

Recapitulation of this point in prima and secunda via:

Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Everyone except Mr. Carrier and his fellow materialists, I presume ... these preferring forces acting on particles in spacetime ...

Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Except Mr. Carrier, I presume, who think it is sth like matter or energy, I presume. With his fellow materialists, of course.

Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

And since Mr. Carrier's fellow materialists, the ancient Epicureans, were out of fashion several centuries before St Thomas, he is using the phrase "all men" ... meaning all men except the materialists he was not thinking of, since they did not socially exist.

Now, could Carrier be right that the necessary being is particles acted on by forces, these residing in the particles and all residing in spacetime?

I have already given a hint on why this is actually not very likely: if the Demokritan atoms were the really necessary being, how is spacetime derived from them?

If they are a necessary being, along with spacetime, how is the relation arranged?

If they are arranged in spacetime, because spacetime is more necessary than they, how can spacetime actually cause particles?

Hans Georg Lundahl
Paris
XVIth Lord's Day after Pentecost
9.IX.2018

A Fault in Carrier's Logic Perception

Correspondence of Hans Georg Lundahl : With Richard Carrier · Carrier carries on the obtusity on a key point ... · somewhere else : Two Observations, Carrier! What if logically necessary means God? · Various Responses to Carrier · A Fault in Carrier's Logic Perception

As you may have perhaps gathered from previous two posts on this blog, I think the 8 propositions do not conclude, as Carrier thinks, in "nothing would give rise to anything, including everything we know, even without God", but in "nothing would give rise to anything, including everything we know, even without God unless God is the necessary being".

He thinks that even though he has all along admitted that whatever it is necessary to exist must exist, both because it must and for this to result, this still excludes God ... from being that necessary being.

Now, I was a bit sloppy in responding a few days ago, and missed a nuance or two in one of his responses.

Here it is:

Wow. I can't believe you are this dense. "Gravity explains the motion of the planets." "Maybe it doesn't, because angels do it. It's possible! Therefore you cannot conclude gravity causes it." "We have logically demonstrated that 1+1=2." "Maybe some hypothetical future logical demonstration will prove 1+1 doesn't = 2. It's possible! Therefore you cannot conclude it has been logically demonstrated or even that it's true that 1+1=2!" "Fermat's Last Theorem has been formally proven." "Maybe there is an error in the proof, some logically necessary fact we don't yet know about that entails the theorem is false. It's possible! Therefore Fermat's Last Theorem has not been formally proven and we shouldn't believe it's true." And on and on. This is how you are arguing. It's the stupidest argument on the planet. Because it entails you should deny all knowledge, because "maybe" some unknown fact refutes it. It displays total ignorance of how logic works, how probability works, how knowledge works, and how sanity works.

As with God being the necessary being, so also angels moving planets is one of the historically available options on the palette.

As long as you don't exclude it, positively, like by saying explicitly "angels don't exist" (which atheists can and Christians can't) you cannot exclude that gravity is a non-explanation OR incomplete explanation of planetary movements.

Obviously, this is sth quite other than appealing to a very tenuous potentiality of a future demonstration 1+1 NOT = 2 or Fermats Last Theorem to be disproven.

As to Fermat's Last Theorem, I am for the moment agnostic, but may be more positive once I have reviewed the apt video on Numberphile or some other math channel on youtube.

But as to 1+1=2, it is the very definition of 2. Precisely as 1+2 is the very definition of 3. And so on.

You cannot disprove a basic definition.

You also cannot disprove a conclusion which follows syllogistically from such, like 2 + 2 = 4.

2 = 1 + 1 (definition)
Therefore + 2 = + 1 + 1 (transitivity of + function)
Therefore 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1
But 2 + 1 = 3 (definition)
Therefore 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1
Therefore 2 + 2 = 3 + 1
But 3 + 1 = 4 (definition)
Therefore 2 + 2 = 4. QED

Here each step has been explicitly argued. I have not counted on omitting sth which could be there.

I have not said "we have 2 + 2" (before my eyes) when I could be wrong and there could be 2 or 4 more hidden (under a table or behind my back). I have not counted on omitting any proposed solutions to a problem.

But if you argue that gravity and inertia explain (exclusive of alternative or complementing explanations) planetary motions from the masses of themselves and of the star they orbit and from initial conditions, and from that, that geocentrism must be wrong, you have omitted that angels could explain planetary and solar motions around the Zodiac (itself in daily motion around earth, a motion explainable by God), and you have omitted that they could explain part of the motions (like a bikers nudges explains part of the bike's motions, while inertia and gravity explain and weight of biker and surface under bike explain a lot of them). Such an omission means you have not demonstrated what you claim to have demonstrated, that "gravitation [and inertia] adequately and correctly explains planetary motions, which means we have to ditch geocentrism, despite its being prima facie empiric".

The best you have is, "if we ditch geocentrism, we can explain daily and periodical motions without God or angels", to which I counter, "if we accept God and angels, we can accept geocentrism, which is good since it is prima facie empiric".

And if you omit to show that God is not involved as the necessary being in your premises, you have also not shown that nothing would give rise to anything without God, you have only shown that nothing would give rise to anything under the circumstances of being only relatively nothing and involving existence of logically necessary existance. Which, as long as you have not excluded that, could be God.

If you like, it could be Dr. Who, as long as you have not excluded that. So, let's exclude Dr. Who from being so.

Dr. Who according to the televised series is actually suffering a few death threats (I have gathered). But the necessary being as such cannot cease to exist nor start to exist. Therefore, Dr. Who cannot be the necessary being as such. If you were claiming he could be an incarnation of the necessary being, I think you know there is a better candidate for that. You have spent books on arguing against that, right?

Done. Dr. Who is not the necessary being.

YOUR TURN, for excluding God, if you can!

Hans Georg Lundahl
Torcy
Nativity of the Blessed Virgin
8.IX.2018

Various Responses to Carrier

Correspondence of Hans Georg Lundahl : With Richard Carrier · Carrier carries on the obtusity on a key point ... · somewhere else : Two Observations, Carrier! What if logically necessary means God? · Various Responses to Carrier · A Fault in Carrier's Logic Perception

1) An excuse.

In my correspondence with you, I missed that you had given a response to me in a comment.

When mirroring this correspondence, on my correspondence blog, I saw it. I caught up.

2) On presuppositionalism.

"But the bulk of this Christian’s argument is presuppositionalism"

Wrong, the bulk of my previous post here is a theistic interpretation of the 8 propositions. However, I did mention presuppositionalism, since I thought it worthwhile to get a red herring out of the way.

Me: “whenever we deal with logical reasoning, we presuppose (hence the name) that there is such a thing as objective logic and that it is accessible to us.”

Carrier: "I didn’t just assert Premise 1, I gave arguments for Premise 1, and linked to even further arguments directly discussing the ontology of logic and why logically impossible things can never exist."

Premise 1 = Proposition 1.

And you actually did it by ... reasoning. Why is this significant? By dancing, you presuppose that dancing is meaningful, by reasoning you presuppose reasoning is so (on whatever level you are reasoning, and you were not limiting yourself to a detective story about agencies similar to yourself, as Sherlock Holmes usually is). You can reason that dancing is meaningful without presupposing it, since you can reason without dancing. But you cannot reason to reasoning being meaningful without presupposing it, since you cannot reason without reasoning. So, you were reasoning ... about ultimate reality.

Thereby showing you already presupposed reasoning a valid approach about the reality not just before your eyes but any number of lightyears away, any number of millions of years ago, and as for sth I actually think will exist, any number of billions of years hence. This is a fairly staggering claim if your reasoning is just a byproduct of chemical processess in your brain.

I most definitely agree that logically impossible things can't exist. One of them being a reasoner which is a by-product of matter doing purely material processes. These following laws which are not the laws of logic.

But you don't agree this is logically impossible, so, I am asking how you can possibly make such vast claims for reason. Not meaning you shouldn't - but meaning how you account for them.

My point is not that Proposition 1 is in any way shape or form wrong, indeed, the bulk of my reply means the very opposite.

My point is, its being true and accessible as certain truth to us presupposes certain things. You could of course say you had been careful to talk only of logical contradictions not occurring, not of our knowing anything about them, but the rest means you are trying to validly deduce sth from it, which involves a claim of knowing sth about them, which involves a claim of being a mind (only minds can know anything, and no, AI machines do not know, speaking of computers "knowing" is a pathetic fallacy, a description of how their behaviour seems - to a mind that knows) - and involves a claim of knowing about both mind and matter that logical necessity cannot fail and logical contradiction cannot prevail.

This was however not my main point, I'll actually get back to this at last.

3) On Boltzmann Gods

What you pretend to respond to is:

Supposing there had been a nothing and any universe could pop out of it, how do you exclude a universe popping out of it by first a god doing so and than that god creating?

What you actually respond involves an affirmative response to universes like ours is on the atheistic view producing sth like gods.

"But inevitably. And in fact, it would happen again and again, forever. So when all is said and done, there will be infinitely many more Boltzmann brains created in this universe than evolved brains like ours. The downside, of course, is that by far nearly all these brains will immediately die in the icy vacuum of space (don’t worry, by far most of these won’t survive long enough to experience even one moment of consciousness). And they would almost never have any company.

Which is how we know we aren’t Boltzmann brains"

[and]

"What is a Boltzmann god? Think of a mind that is as near to perfection and power as could ever be physically made, a supermind, with a superbody, maybe even a body spanning and permeating a whole vast region of spacetime. The improbability of this is staggering. But remember, everything with a nonzero probability is going to happen, eventually. In fact, it’s going to happen infinitely many times."

From The God Impossible
by Richard Carrier on March 8, 2012
https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/510

That was not the proposition. The proposition was rather, what if the singularity producing OUR universe was - a god. In other words, how do you exclude propositions like Enuma Elish or even better Theogony?

Also, if you are logical about "infinite time" you will need to accept the Boltzmann God already was produced in some universe - so, how can you exclude such a Bolzmann God from having produced ours?

Note, that would very much NOT be the Christian proposal. You very rightly distinguish this from a monotheism which posits one single God as the source not just of our universe, but of any possible one.

4) On the main issue.

It is a contradiction for that which cannot not exist to not exist. This is true whatever this logically necessary entity is. And it is also true whether we have identified it rightly, or wrongly, or not at all.

If the necessary being is space-time and particles, then it is a contradiction for space-time and particles not to exist, whether it be thought the necessary existence is space-time and particles, or the monotheistic God or the matter not be decided.

If the necessary being is the monotheistic God, then it is a contradiction for the monotheistic God not to exist, whether it be thought the necessary existence is the monotheistic God, or space-time and matter or the matter not be decided.

You have given an excellent argument on why there is such a thing as a necessary being. Suppose all beings were non-necessary.

"But remember, everything with a nonzero probability is going to happen, eventually."

Then sooner or later all beings would not exist. And with an infinity of time past, it would already have happened.

But if at a point nothing existed - nothing could come from it.

This is of course what you contest with your 8 propositions, but then you are not really granting "nothing existed" as part of the scenario. You are only granting "nothing except what is logically necessary existed". And that would imply the existence of a logically necessary existence.

Now, I was, and I am, giving "the monotheistic God" as at least one of the alternatives for "necessary existence". I am then inserting that into the 8 propositions and showing how very Theistic they become with that insertion.

Now, I was not setting out to prove that the monotheistic God is that necessary existence. I was merely showing that if He was, the consequences of all your 8 propositions are perfectly orthodox. And also challenging you to - if you could - deny that identification.

Now, if you were only Agnostic, the burden of proof would be on me, but as you are a strong Atheist, we have about an equal one.

And I thought, as you actually seemed unconscious of how Theistic your 8 propositions are with such an identification of necessary existence, maybe you should tell us you were conscious of it and show why they could not possibly tolerate such a Theistic interpretation.

Hans Georg Lundahl
Nanterre UL
St. Moses
4.IX.2018